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Beyond Backlash: Legal History, 
Polarization, and Roe v. Wade 
Mary Ziegler∗ 
Abstract 
On its fortieth anniversary, Roe v. Wade serves as the most 
prominent example of the damage judicial review can do to the 
larger society. Scholars from across the ideological spectrum have 
related how Roe helped to entrench the ideological positions held 
by those on either side of the abortion issue, precluding any form 
of productive compromise. This criticism, which the Article calls 
the “beyond backlash” argument, has profound legal consequences, 
serving as both a justification for overruling Roe and as a case 
study of the benefits of varying interpretive methods. 
This Article reevaluates the beyond backlash claim through a 
careful historical study of the world of abortion politics in the 
decade after Roe. It unearths a surprising set of negotiations 
between activists who believed in shared solutions. Roe certainly 
intensified conflict, prompting a nationalization of pro-life 
activities and sparking an academic debate about judicial review. 
Nonetheless, as the Article argues, the ideological entrenchment 
we associate with Roe came later than we have thought and 
emerged for reasons beyond the Court’s decision. 
This Article uses this history as an entry point for rethinking 
the uses to which post-Roe history is put in contemporary debate 
about judicial review. The beyond backlash argument uses Roe as 
shorthand for a wide array of strategic decisions and political 
events. Disentangling the decision from the events following it will 
allow scholars to have a more principled debate about what 
responses to Roe actually teach us about the role of the courts. At a 
minimum, the Article suggests that scholars have overstated the 
degree to which Roe immediately polarized discussion. Until we 
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better understand the causes for the radicalization of abortion 
politics, we should not rely so heavily on Roe in reasoning about 
the consequences of judicial review.  
As importantly, reexamining the beyond backlash narrative 
makes apparent that polarization is neither inevitable nor beyond 
the control of nonjudicial actors. If we wish to create a more 
reasoned abortion debate, Roe cannot stop us from doing so. 
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I. Introduction 
In May 2013, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, perhaps the 
strongest defender of abortion rights on the Supreme Court, 
suggested that Roe v. Wade1 “stopped the momentum that was on 
                                                                                                     
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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the side of change.”2 As marriage-equality litigation continues to 
move into the Supreme Court, Ginsburg’s comments have revived 
discussion of Roe’s damaging effects. Most often, scholars focus on 
the ways in which Roe set back the abortion cause, undercutting 
the progress that the pro-choice movement had made.3 
Conventionally, however, we believe that Roe’s impact went much 
further. Scholars from Robin West to Jeffrey Rosen argue that 
Roe helped to entrench the ideological positions held by those on 
either side of the issue, precluding any form of productive 
compromise.4 The polarization produced by Roe spilled over into 
other legal conflicts about gender, helping to doom the Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA), to energize the New Right and the 
Religious Right, and to put off potentially promising alliances in 
support of caretaking.5 Beyond backlash, Roe bequeathed to the 
                                                                                                     
 2. Emily Bazelon, Backlash Whiplash: Is Justice Ginsburg Right that Roe 
v. Wade Should Make the Court Cautious About Gay Marriage?, SLATE (May 14, 
2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/ 
2013/05/justice_ginsburg_and_roe_v_wade_caution_for_gay_marriage.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 468 (2004) (suggesting 
that litigation alone “cannot fundamentally transform a nation”); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 520 (2001) (contending that Roe “undermine[d] [abortion] 
right[s] by stimulating extra opposition to them”). 
 4. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 79, 124–
27 (2003) (discussing Roe as a pragmatic decision that had the effect of stifling 
“potentially worthwhile social experimentation”); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST 
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 96 (2006) (“[W]hen the 
Supreme Court struck some of these abortion restrictions down in the late 1970s 
and ’80s, it finally energized abortion opponents who otherwise would have had 
to make their case in the political arena.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some 
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 
381, 381–82 (1985) (“Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and academic 
criticism, in part, I believe, because the Court ventured too far in the change it 
ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its action.” (footnote 
omitted)); Cass Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Three Civil 
Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991) (using Roe as an example to 
show that courts are not always the proper institution to bring about social 
change); Robin West, From Free Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-
constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1394–1404 (2009) 
(describing the fact that Roe hangs by a thread, is subject to the political tides of 
the president, and lacks criticisms from the pro-choice movement). 
 5. Infra Part II.  
972 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969 (2014) 
American people what Emily Bazelon has called “the intractable, 
depressing national divide over abortion.”6 
Whereas backlash arguments address the harm judicial 
decisions do to social-change movements, Roe’s critics focus on 
the damage done by judicial intervention to the larger society.7 
This criticism, which the Article calls the “beyond backlash” 
argument, has profound legal consequences. Justice Antonin 
Scalia has woven this argument into a demand for the overruling 
of Roe.8 In the broader legal academy, scholars believe that post-
Roe polarization provides a powerful warning about the 
consequences of particular interpretive methods—particularly, 
when the Court decides too much too soon.9 Forty years after Roe, 
the decision serves as a central example of the dangers of judicial 
review.10 
This Article reevaluates the beyond backlash claim through a 
careful historical study of abortion politics in the decade after 
Roe. It unearths a surprising set of negotiations between activists 
who believed it possible to find common legal ground.11 Roe 
certainly intensified conflict, prompting a nationalization of pro-
life activities and sparking an academic debate about judicial 
review.12 Nonetheless, as the Article argues, the ideological 
                                                                                                     
 6. Bazelon, supra note 2. 
 7. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“Roe may have taken national policy 
too abruptly to a point toward which it was groping more slowly, and in the 
process may have prevented state legislatures from working out long-lasting 
solutions based upon broad public consensus.” (footnote omitted)). 
 8. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998–
1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the political pressure on the 
Court caused by Roe and arguing that if the Court did what it is supposed to 
doread the Constitution and discern our society’s understanding of that 
textthen the people would leave the Court alone). 
 9. See infra Part II (exploring this scholarship at greater length). 
 10. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 519 (citing Roe as an example of the 
Court meddling too much in the political process). 
 11. Infra Part IV.  
 12. On the federalization of the abortion issue after Roe, see, for example, 
Scott Idleman, Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics, and American 
Constitutionalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1021 (1996) (reviewing ISAAC 
KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE 
AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996)) (“Roe . . . more or less ensured that 
abortion would become a national issue and that abortion-related activism, 
whether for or against, would become nationalized . . . .”). On the academic 
debate sparked by Roe, see, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE 
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entrenchment we associate with Roe came later than we thought 
and emerged for reasons beyond the Court’s decision. 
The Article chronicles a complex effort on the part of 
opposing activists to find consensus—if not on abortion, then on 
the gender issues associated with it.13 Moderate pro-life activists 
worked to redefine the legal right to choose, requiring 
government support for a range of reproductive choices.14 Some in 
the pro-choice movement supported some form of fetal rights, 
considering them in the larger context of debate about medical 
ethics, human experimentation, and human dignity.15 These 
stories show that judicial review did not intensify abortion 
conflict in the way we have often believed. 
Furthermore, the Article provides compelling new evidence 
that the polarization of the struggle increased at least partly 
“without the intermediation of judicial review.”16 The dynamics of 
gradual political party realignment in the 1970s, the mobilization 
of the New Right and the Religious Right, the setbacks 
confronted by the pro-choice movement, the emergence of 
effective new pro-life litigation strategies, and the declining 
popularity of the welfare state all helped to undermine 
preexisting efforts to find common ground.17 
The Article uses this history as an entry point for rethinking 
the uses to which post-Roe history is put in contemporary debate 
about judicial review. The beyond backlash argument uses Roe as 
                                                                                                     
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 299–313 (2009) (discussing the intellectual 
debate Roe sparked over how the Constitution should be interpreted and the 
political backlash with the rise of the New Right). 
 13. See infra Part VI (discussing ways that activists on both sides of the 
abortion debate could come together for certain causes such as contraceptives). 
 14. See Thomas W. Hilgers, Marjory Mecklenburg & Gayle Riordan, Is 
Abortion the Best We Have to Offer?: A Challenge to the Aborting Society, in 
ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 177, 180 (Thomas W. Hilgers & Dennis J. Horan 
eds., 1972) (“Both those who favor and oppose abortion can agree that a woman 
with a problem pregnancy needs help. The suggestions which follow represent 
new ideas and an extension of the old.”). 
 15. See infra Part IV (discussing the pro-choice movement’s views of fetal 
rights outside of the abortion context). 
 16. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: 
New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2033 (2011). 
 17. See infra Part V (explaining the various political changes occurring in 
the 1970s that contributed to the political backlash of Roe). 
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shorthand for a wide array of strategic decisions and political 
events.18 Disentangling the decision from the events following it 
will allow scholars to have a more principled debate about what 
Roe actually teaches us about the role of the courts. At a 
minimum, the Article suggests that scholars have overstated the 
degree to which Roe immediately polarized discussion.19 Until we 
better understand the causes of the radicalization of abortion 
politics, we should not rely so heavily on Roe in reasoning about 
the consequences of judicial review.  
As importantly, reexamining the beyond backlash narrative 
makes apparent that polarization is neither inevitable nor beyond 
the control of nonjudicial actors. If we want to create a less 
dysfunctional abortion politics, we have it in our power to do so. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly sets out the 
beyond backlash narrative, examining the evidence offered for 
Roe’s disastrous impact on national politics. Part III begins to 
complicate this narrative. This Part recovers the lost history of 
antiabortion efforts to define and protect some form of 
reproductive choice for women. Tracing these efforts across legal 
debates about healthcare, child care, family planning, and 
pregnancy discrimination, the Article uncovers a new 
antiabortion argument used in the years immediately after the 
Supreme Court decided Roe. Abortion opponents argued that the 
state could ban abortion only if it conferred rights on women after 
pregnancy.20 For this reason, activists campaigned for reforms 
that created new protections for caretakers, arguing that 
reproductive choice lost meaning if the state did not support 
women raising children.21 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2086 (“We suggest . . . that 
the dominance of the ‘Court-caused-it’ backlash narrative has shortchanged 
both legal scholars and the general public of a more complete understanding of 
an important chapter in America’s social, political, and legal history.”). 
 19. See id. at 2086–87 (discussing the fact that Roe was only one factor 
among many in the polarization of abortion as a political issue in America); 
infra Part VII (making conclusions based on the various historical, legal, and 
political facts offered in the Article). 
 20. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the 
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1656 
(2008) (“In the years after Roe, it was not the antiabortion movement that was 
making claims about protecting women’s choices and women’s health; these were 
the claims and frames of the movement’s abortion-rights adversaries.”). 
 21. Id. 
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Part IV examines pro-choice conversations about medical 
experimentation, fetal life, and informed consent. In the midst of 
scandals concerning medical exploitation and sterilization abuse, 
some in the pro-choice movement worked to carve out a space for 
fetal rights that did not conflict with Roe.22 
Part V studies the reasons a world of possible compromise 
gave way to one of greater ideological entrenchment. This Part 
spotlights the role played by ongoing political party realignment, 
the emergence of the New Right and the Religious Right in 
American politics, and the ascendancy of incrementalist litigators 
in the pro-life movement.  
Part VI asks what this history teaches us about Roe’s last 
forty years and its future ramifications, and Part VII briefly 
concludes.  
II. Beyond Backlash: Roe and American Politics 
Conventional backlash arguments examine the impact of a 
judicial decision on the cause it advances.23 As Michael Klarman 
explains, a court “venturing too far in advance of public opinion” 
might “undermine the cause” advanced by social movement 
members.24 Klarman and Gerald Rosenberg focus primarily on 
the utility of litigation as a source of social change.25 While 
                                                                                                     
 22. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PRIVACY COMMITTEE MEETING 
MINUTES, June 16, 1976, 1–2 [hereinafter ACLU MEETING MINUTES, June 1976] 
(discussing protections for fetal rights that were consistent with Roe’s holdings 
regarding fetus viability and the importance of the life of the mother) (on file 
with Mudd Library, Princeton University, Box 112, The ACLU Papers, Folder 8 
“Rare Books and Manuscripts Division”). 
 23. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2032 (“The backlash 
narrative conventionally identifies the Supreme Court’s decision as the cause of 
polarizing conflict and imagines backlash as arising in response to the Court 
repressing politics.” (footnote omitted)). 
 24. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 203 (2013). 
 25. See id. at 166  
Not only do court decisions make people aware of previously 
unnoticed social change and force politicians to take positions on 
issues that they previously have ducked, but they also impose 
substantive resolutions of policy issues that may be very different 
from those supported by most voters. It is this aspect of judicial 
decisions that is the most important cause of backlash. 
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Rosenberg contends that the courts are largely ineffective in 
reshaping social, moral, or political norms, Klarman suggests 
that litigation can make things worse for the social movements 
that the Court tried to help.26 
However, criticisms of Roe go beyond the conventional 
backlash narrative.27 Scholars, Supreme Court Justices, and 
grassroots activists argue that the 1973 decision did broader 
political damage.28 Richard Posner suggests that Roe cut off a 
promising, state-by-state negotiation about the scope and 
rationale of abortion rights.29 If the Court had not imposed a 
single, national result on a divided polity, Posner reasons, 
lawmakers might have arrived at an approach that commended 
itself to those on both sides of the issue.30 
Cass Sunstein and Jeffrey Rosen further contend that Roe 
helped to radicalize broader American gender politics.31 In 
Rosen’s view, Roe empowered extremists on either side who 
                                                                                                     
See also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 422 (2d ed. 2008) (“U.S. courts can almost never be significant 
producers of effective social reform.”).  
 26. Compare KLARMAN, supra note 3, at 422 (discussing the violent 
outbursts across the country in reaction to Brown’s school desegregation), with 
ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 420–24 (concluding as to when and under what 
conditions courts can produce significant social reform and using Brown and Roe 
as examples). 
 27. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“[T]he decision may well have 
created the Moral Majority, helped defeat the equal rights amendment, and 
undermined the women’s movement by spurring opposition and demobilizing 
potential adherents.” (footnote omitted)). 
 28. See Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 381–83 (discussing how Roe went too far 
in taking a “medical approach” and the implications of this medical approach); 
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (discussing the implications of Roe); Mary Ziegler, 
The Possibility of Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade, 87 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 572 (2012) [hereinafter Ziegler, Possibility of 
Compromise] (discussing STOP ERA’s belief that Roe affected its efforts). 
 29. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 125 (“[B]ut the Court ignored an 
important consequence—the stifling effect on democratic experimentation of 
establishing a constitutional right to abortion.”). 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 254 (discussing the potential outcomes of different 
decisions by the Court in Roe). 
 31. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 90–97 (discussing the effect of the Roe 
decision on American politics, particularly with judicial nominations); Sunstein, 
supra note 4, at 766 (“[Roe] may well have created the Moral Majority, helped 
defeat the equal rights amendment, and undermined the women’s movement by 
spurring opposition and demobilizing potential adherents.” (citation omitted)). 
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rejected the idea of compromise out of hand.32 Sunstein asserts 
that Roe helped to mobilize religious conservatives who 
successfully defeated the ERA and undercut the women’s 
movement.33 William Eskridge elaborates on the way in which 
Roe empowered traditionalists in the pro-life movement who 
resisted any change to women’s roles.34 In the view of Eskridge 
and his colleague John Ferejohn, Roe’s reasoning moved pro-life 
traditionalists to more extreme positions and embittered the 
abortion battle.35 
Beyond backlash arguments have influence outside the legal 
academy. Beginning in the 1980s, leading pro-lifers have used 
these arguments as a reason for overruling Roe.36 For example, in 
1981, Dr. John Willke, a leading abortion opponent since the pre-
Roe period, argued that Roe should be overruled because of its 
impact on American politics: “[W]e live in a Nation that is totally 
polarized on this issue,” he asserted.37 “Unlike other issues in the 
body politic, there is no middle ground, there is no compromise.”38 
Justice Antonin Scalia has made beyond backlash arguments 
a part of American constitutional law. In Planned Parenthood of 
                                                                                                     
 32. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 4, at 100 (“The result is a polarizing gap 
between the moderation of the country as a whole on abortion and the radical 
opposition it continues to inspire among conservative legal elites.”).  
 33. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“[T]he decision may well have 
created the Moral Majority, helped defeat the equal rights amendment, and 
undermined the women’s movement by spurring opposition and demobilizing 
potential adherents.” (citation omitted)). 
 34. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 3, at 520 (“[A]ny substantial success on 
the part of the pro-choice movement would have triggered a strong 
countermovement, for it would have altered important status entitlements and 
gender roles.”). 
 35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 242 (2010) (“Pro-life traditionalists 
mobilized as a normative social movement seeking to preserve not only human 
life but also a traditionalist ethic of family values and women’s domestic 
role. . . . [T]he movement sought to amend the Constitution to overrule Roe.”). 
 36. See Confirmation of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court: 
Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong. 282 (Sept. 10, 1981) 
(statement of Dr. John Willke, President, National Right to Life Committee) 
(analogizing Roe to Dred Scott as an example of another case that exists as a 
“blot upon our Nation”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,39 the majority used post-Roe 
backlash in explaining the need to hold fast to Roe’s “essential” 
holding.40 Were the Court to hold otherwise, the Casey majority 
suggested, the Justices would signal their vulnerability to 
political pressure.41 
Scalia responded that maintaining Roe, just like deciding it, 
would make the abortion battle more dysfunctional.42 Scalia 
explained:  
Roe’s mandate for abortion on demand destroyed the 
compromises of the past, rendered compromise 
impossible for the future, and required the entire issue 
to be resolved uniformly, at the national level . . . . Roe 
fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national 
politics in general, and has obscured with its smoke the 
selection of Justices to this Court in particular, ever 
since. And by keeping us in the abortion-umpiring 
business, it is the perpetuation of that disruption [. . .] 
that the Court’s new majority decrees.43 
In Scalia’s view, Roe created a politics of violence, radicalization, 
and hostility to the Court.44 The opinion’s unconvincing, result-
oriented reasoning angered a public that demanded principled 
decision making.45 Furthermore, the Court’s imposition of a 
single, national solution precluded any meaningful effort to find 
consensus on the abortion issue.46 Only overruling Roe, Scalia 
                                                                                                     
 39. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 40. See id. at 867 (“So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most 
compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s 
legitimacy beyond any serious question.”). 
 41. See id. (“[T]o reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s 
legitimacy beyond any serious question . . . [and] [t]he country’s loss of 
confidence in the Judiciary would be underscored by an equally certain and 
equally reasonable condemnation for another failing in overruling unnecessarily 
and under pressure.”). 
 42. See id. at 997–1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how the plurality 
opinion’s “maintaining” of Roe is actually inconsistent with the principals of Roe 
and arguing that the Supreme Court must get out of the debate because it has 
no right to be there in the first place). 
 43. Id. at 996–97. 
 44. See id. (discussing the public and political reactions and effects of Roe). 
 45. See id. at 995–97 (discussing the problem with standing by Roe because 
of the public opinion against it and noting that this Nietzchean vision of the 
Court is not what the Founders envisioned). 
 46. See id. at 995 (“Roe’s mandate for abortion on demand destroyed the 
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tells us, would offer any opportunity to create a more productive 
dialogue about abortion.47 
Beyond backlash arguments speak to courts as much as to 
social movement members. These contentions ask courts to 
consider the impact their decisions will have not just on a 
particular cause but also on the larger geography of American 
politics. Roe serves as a warning about the harm that courts can 
do in exercising judicial review.48 
As importantly, beyond backlash arguments offer a 
compelling narrative about the world Roe produced. In this 
account, opposing movements responded to Roe by taking more 
extreme positions and became less flexible in their gender 
politics.49 Possible partnerships on related issues, including 
family planning, sex discrimination, and maternal rights, became 
impossible.50 
What features of Roe supposedly produced this stalemate? 
Some scholars point to the decision’s timing. Michael McConnell 
has described Roe as a decision “that cuts off deliberation and 
debate, that makes compromise impossible, and that eliminates 
political solutions.”51 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn 
similarly describe Roe as an effort “to close off active democratic 
                                                                                                     
compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and 
required the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national level.”). 
 47. See id. at 1002 (“[B]y banishing the issue from the political forum that 
gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an 
honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of 
allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the 
anguish.”). 
 48. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional 
Horticulture: Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 
1293–94 (2009) (using Roe as an example of why judicial review should be 
limited). 
 49. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 472–73 (discussing the 
countermovements from Roe and the success of the pro-life and anti-ERA 
movements); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 572 
(discussing the “polarization narrative”). 
 50. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 589 (discussing 
the conventional “polarization narrative” of scholars, which suggests that after 
Roe compromise on issues was impossible). 
 51. Michael McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming 
Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1540 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL 
J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)).  
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deliberation through activist judicial review.”52 In 1985, Justice 
Ginsburg pioneered such an argument about Roe’s timing.53 
Before the opinion came down, Ginsburg asserts, the pro-choice 
movement had made impressive progress in the states.54 Because 
the Court decided too much too soon, the pro-life movement was 
able to reverse this trend and introduce new abortion 
restrictions.55 Because the public did not yet support the 
expansive abortion rights Roe announced, the opinion 
unnecessarily angered abortion opponents and radicalized 
discussion of the issue.56  
Others emphasize the sweeping holding and rationale Roe 
offered. Cass Sunstein, whose minimalist theory urges an 
incremental approach to judicial decision making, describes Roe 
as “a large mistake.”57 Richard Posner’s judicial pragmatism also 
appears incompatible with Roe’s far-reaching holding.58 
Arguments about Roe’s consequences figure centrally in 
conversations about the role played by the courts in American 
democracy. Scholars use Roe as a case study of the unexpected 
harms produced by judicial review.59 Some, like Sunstein and 
                                                                                                     
 52. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 48, at 1302.  
 53. See Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 381–84 (discussing the legislative 
movements prior to the Roe decision and how Roe effected the change that was 
occurring before the decision). 
 54. See id. at 379–80 (describing the movement towards liberalization of 
abortion statutes across states and the Texas law at issue in Roe as “the most 
extreme prohibition extant”). 
 55. See id. at 381 (“Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The 
sweep and detail of the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life 
movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state legislatures.”). 
 56. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (“[T]he decision . . . spur[red] 
opposition and demobilize[ed] potential adherents. . . . At the same time, Roe 
may have taken national policy too abruptly to a point toward which it was 
groping more slowly . . . .”). 
 57. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist Constitution, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 37–38 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) 
(“Minimalists want to avoid broad, ambitious judicial rulings.”).  
 58. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 257 (“But Roe v. Wade was not [an 
easy interpretive case] and the decision is more realistically understood as a 
reflection of the relative weight that seven Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
placed on fetal life and women’s reproductive autonomy than as a consequence 
of reading the Constitution carefully . . . .”). 
 59. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 3, at 520 (“Roe illustrates the central 
problem with a philosophy that rejects pragmatic considerations in 
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Posner, rely on Roe as an illustration of the relative 
disadvantages of particular modes of constitutional 
interpretation.60 Even within the Court, Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg turn to Roe’s effects in reasoning about the best path 
forward in American abortion law.61 In stories about the power of 
the courts, Roe serves as a cautionary tale.62 Scholars urge judges 
to consider this history before issuing decisions with damaging 
consequences.63 
Parts III and IV use original archival evidence to test the 
beyond backlash hypothesis. A number of scholars have argued 
that conflict over abortion began well before Roe, as activists 
mobilized to change state laws. This Article breaks new ground 
by showing that opportunities for compromise remained after the 
decision. Part III examines one effort of this kind—an 
antiabortion effort to create a new right of reproductive choice. 
III. The Pro-Life Movement and Reproductive Freedom 
In the mid-1970s, both pro-choice and pro-life activists 
offered a capacious new understanding of reproductive freedom.64 
                                                                                                     
constitutional jurisprudence . . . .”).  
 60. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 4, at 766 (discussing Roe as an 
illustration of the Court’s limited efficacy in bringing about social change). 
 61. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982–85 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Roe, the public reactions to Roe, and 
how the Court should deal with those reactions in making decisions regarding 
abortion law); Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 386 (“I understand the view that for 
political reasons the reproductive autonomy controversy should be isolated from 
the general debate on equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for 
women and men. I expect . . . that organized and determined opposing efforts to 
inform and persuade the public on the abortion issue will continue . . . .”). 
 62. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 995–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the 
Casey opinion as an example that “[t]he Imperial Judiciary lives” and 
questioning whether the Court was following its Constitutional duties by 
continuing to stick with Roe). 
 63. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2086  
[T]he history of conflict before and after Roe suggests that in thinking 
about the possibilities and limits of adjudication, we need to be 
attentive to the motives for conflict that emerge from sources outside 
as well as inside the courtroom, from directions and actors that may 
shift over time. 
 64. See SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION 
AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 61–62 (1991) (describing the post-Roe 
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Although they disagreed profoundly about abortion and the 
nature of motherhood, opposing activists believed that 
reproductive choice lost meaning if women did not have the 
financial means to raise children without sacrificing their 
careers, educations, or health.65 Many feminists argued that 
reproductive choice required access to and funding for abortion,66 
whereas most abortion opponents favored an amendment that 
would ban abortions performed by private as well as state 
actors.67 While pro-lifers often saw motherhood as women’s 
natural role, feminists wished to separate women’s reproductive 
capacities and social obligations.68 Nonetheless, those on opposing 
sides of the abortion issue collaborated successfully in 
campaigning for protections for adolescent mothers and bans on 
                                                                                                     
emergence of “multi-issue organizations” that fought for a broad variety 
women’s issues); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 582 
(discussing the new position of American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL) 
that protection and economic equality of pregnant women was important to 
prevent abortion). 
 65. See STAGGENBORG, supra note 64, at 113 (“The Reproductive Rights 
National Network . . . demand[ed] not only the right to legal abortion, but also 
the right to child care, health care, an adequate income, and other conditions 
that would allow women a real choice as to whether or not to have 
children . . . .”); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 575 (“[T]he 
Mecklenburg faction supported or at least accepted broad access to family 
planning services, as well as publicly funded daycare.”). 
 66. For discussion of feminist interest in abortion funding, see, for example, 
SERENE MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 191 (2011) (discussing the “battle over abortion funding” and its 
linking of feminists and civil rights advocates because “[w]hen poor women did 
seek abortion, lack of funds more than legal restrictions stood in their way”); 
JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
82 (2003) (“Mary Treadwell echoed Gray’s notion of reproductive freedom when 
she insisted that feminists needed to take into account the economic needs of 
poor women of color when they spoke of abortion rights.”). 
 67. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 209–10 (1992) (“[Pro-life 
groups] also, at least initially, concurred on the single best vehicle for achieving 
that goal—an amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”). On the campaign for fetal-
rights amendment in the early 1970s, see, for example, STAGGENBORG, supra 
note 64, at 69, 71, 106–07. 
 68. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the 
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 450–55 
(2011) (discussing the Citizen’s Advisory Council on the Status of Women and 
feminists’ attempt to seek temporary disability for pregnant women by arguing 
that while child gestation can only be done by women, both men and women can 
perform childrearing). 
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pregnancy discrimination.69 These activists agreed that true 
choice would require state assistance.70 
A. Trauma, Abortion, and Unintended Pregnancy 
Pro-life arguments about reproductive choice emerged from 
earlier dialogue about the impact of abortion on women’s mental 
health.71 Beginning in the mid-1960s, a handful of states 
reformed their abortion laws to make the procedure legal on the 
basis of mental health, among other reasons.72 Looking to the 
model statute adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI), 
these reform states also permitted abortion on a variety of 
grounds.73 Nonetheless, as the number of abortions performed 
annually increased, psychiatric abortions became the most 
accessible.74 Women infrequently reported cases of rape, incest, 
                                                                                                     
 69. See id. at 471 n.346 (“The specter of abortion, however, led some social 
conservatives to support the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)] as a new 
form of state protection for motherhood.”); Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, 
supra note 28, at 582 (“[T]he [ACCL] positioned itself as a reasonable 
antiabortion organization with which a variety of abortion advocacy groups 
could work.”). 
 70. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 582 (discussing 
the ACCL’s efforts against Gilbert that aligned with those of a feminist, pro-
choice coalition). 
 71. See Thomas W. Hilgers, The Medical Hazards of Legally Induced 
Abortion, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 57, 75–77 
(discussing the psychiatric problems women encounter after an abortion); Fred 
E. Mecklenburg, The Indications for Induced Abortion: A Physician’s 
Perspective, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 37, 39–41 
(discussing the impact of abortion versus birth on the mother).  
 72. See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 
65 (1984) (“In 1959, the American Law Institute had proposed a Model Penal 
Code that would have written into the abortion law the considerations some 
doctors were already using: the mental health of the mother, rape or incest, and 
fetal deformity.”); LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, 
MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973, at 220–21 (1997) (“[The 
model law] allowed licensed physicians to perform abortions for physical and 
mental health reasons, fetal defects, or when pregnancy was the result of rape 
or incest.” (footnote omitted)). 
 73. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 16, at 2037–38 (discussing the 
model statute and the effect that it had on state laws). 
 74. See Christopher Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963 to 
1968, STUDIES IN FAM. PLAN., Nov. 1970, at 5, 5 (showing that between 1963 and 
1968, total abortions increased from 390 to 4,626 and psychiatric abortions 
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and fetal abnormality, and with improvements to obstetric and 
gynecological care, fewer physicians could fit abortions within 
physical-health exceptions.75 Between 1963 and 1968, a published 
study reported a seven-fold increase in the number of psychiatric 
abortions performed.76 
To avoid legal liability, physicians had to fit a variety of 
social and economic decisions into the category of psychiatric 
abortions.77 In 1970, Studies in Family Planning found that a 
majority of psychiatric abortions were not “strictly psychiatric” 
but rather justified on the basis of “impulsive behavior, 
misjudgment, [and] environmental factors like alcoholism, drug 
use, and some types of adolescent behavior.”78 In diagnosing a 
woman as depressed or suicidal, as other studies reported, 
physicians took into account a woman’s socioeconomic or marital 
status.79 
Providers justified a wide variety of abortions—including 
those chosen for social or economic reasons—on psychiatric 
grounds.80 By extension, the emerging pro-choice movement 
suggested that legal abortion would prevent a great deal of 
psychological trauma.81 In a strategy memorandum to pro-choice 
                                                                                                     
increased from 44.6% of abortions to 69.6%). 
 75. See, e.g., LUKER, supra note 72, at 54 (“Between the two world wars, 
medical science made large strides in eliminating or discovering new treatments 
for conditions that had previously threatened maternal health.”). 
 76. See Tietze, supra note 74, at 5 (showing that in 1963, 174 psychiatric 
abortions were performed compared to 3,219 in 1968). 
 77. See Sidney H. Norman et al., Abortion: Obtained and Denied, STUD. IN 
FAM. PLAN., May 1970, at 1, 4 (discussing the fact that women would enter a 
psychiatric evaluation with the goal of obtaining an abortion and “[t]he most 
important consideration in the psychiatrist’s mind . . . is the total effect on the 
woman and her family of carrying the pregnancy to term”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., John A. Ewing & Beatrice A. Rouse, Therapeutic Abortion and 
a Prior Psychiatric History, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 37, 38 (1973) (“The study 
group consisted of black and white women from all socioeconomic levels.”); John 
R. Partridge et al., A Study of Psychiatric Applicants at North Carolina Medical 
Hospital, 32 N.C. MED. J. 131, 132–36 (1971) (discussing the demographic 
information that the study collected). 
 80. See Norman, supra note 77, at 4 (“The majority of abortions performed 
on psychiatric recommendation . . . do not appear to be ‘strictly psychiatric’ . . . . 
The symptoms presented by patients usually consist of a variety of personality 
disorders . . . interacting with environmental problems . . . .”). 
 81. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1653 n.44 (discussing “a substantial body 
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activists, leading advocate Larry Lader wrote: “Cite cases of how 
women’s lives were ruined by being forced to bear an unwanted 
child . . . [and] the tragedy of the unwanted child, possibly leading 
to the battered child and infanticide.”82 Similarly, the official 
debate manual of the National Association for the Repeal of 
Abortion Laws (NARAL, later known as the National Abortion 
Rights Action League) described the psychological harms averted 
by legal abortion.83 Liberalizing archaic laws would “decrease the 
number of unwanted children, battered children, child abuse 
cases, and possibly subsequent delinquency, drug addiction, and 
a host of social ills associated with neglectful parenthood.”84 The 
manual also counseled activists on how to respond to allegations 
that abortion would psychologically damage women.85 The 
response was: “While many women are known to be hospitalized 
with mental illness following childbirth, such severe psychosis 
following abortion is virtually unknown.”86 
Beginning in the 1960s, scholars opposed to abortion 
responded by arguing that abortion caused psychiatric distress. 
Legal scholar Dennis Mahoney explained: “[T]herapeutic 
abortion . . . carries with it a degree of emotional trauma far 
exceeding that which would have been sustained by continuation 
of the pregnancy.”87 Another scholar went further in outlining the 
damage done by abortion: “Social reasons can never be held 
sufficient to warrant the dangers of emotional trauma that . . . 
[women] will subsequently experience. ‘[Abortion] cannot be to 
                                                                                                     
of scholarship that repudiates claims of post-abortion syndrome”). 
 82. Memorandum from Larry Lader, Chairman of the Bd. Nat’l Ass’n for 
Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL), to NARAL Bd. Members et al. 2 (Fall 1972) 
(on file with the Schlesinger Library, Harvard University, The NARAL Papers, 
MC 313, Carton 8, Folder “Debating the Opposition”). 
 83. See id. at 5 (“Women undergoing the degradation, danger, and expense 
of a clandestine abortion are quite likely to experience negative after-effects, but 
this is not true in situations where abortion is legally sanctioned and widely 
accepted.”). 
 84. Id.  
 85. See id. (outlining what to say when abortion opponents argue that 
“[w]omen undergoing abortions suffer severe and lasting psychological 
sequelae”). 
 86. Id.  
 87. Dennis Mahoney, Therapeutic Abortions—The Psychiatric Indication—
A Double-Edged Sword, 72 DICK. L. REV. 270, 288–89 (1968). 
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prevent mental illness, for abortion is not a prophylactic against 
psychosis, but rather a precipitant.’”88 
When the American Medical Association debated abortion 
reform in 1967, one antiabortion physician contended that “all 
clinical experience shows that abortion is a mental wound as well 
as a physical wound.”89  
Roe borrowed significantly from discussion of the 
relationship between pregnancy and trauma in explaining the 
constitutional significance of the abortion decision. In explaining 
why women had a privacy interest in abortion, the Court stressed 
the psychological impact unintended pregnancy and childbirth 
had on women: 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant 
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific 
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early 
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, 
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical 
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, 
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and 
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already 
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other 
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing 
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.90 
Pregnancy signaled mental problems and “a distressful life and 
future.”91 Women, whom the Court assumed to be caretakers, 
would have their mental health taxed by childcare, as would 
unwanted children.92 These harms followed inevitably from a 
woman’s sexual decisions.93 Women became victims of their own 
choices, suffering on account of the “continuing stigma of unwed 
                                                                                                     
 88. John G. Herbert, Is Legalized Abortion the Solution to Criminal 
Abortion?, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 291, 291 (1964) (citation omitted). 
 89. Martin Tolchin, Doctors Divided on Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1967, at 
23.  
 90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. (“Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.”). 
 93. See id. at 147, 153 (discussing how Texas’s purpose for the abortion 
statute was “to discourage illicit sexual conduct” and describing the harms that 
flow from an unwanted pregnancy). 
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motherhood” and the “[p]sychological harm” associated with 
unwed motherhood.94 
B. Vulnerable Mothers and Reproductive Choice 
Because Roe foregrounded the question of mental illness, the 
opinion reinforced social-movement interest in debating the 
relationship between trauma, pregnancy, and abortion. In the 
aftermath of the decision, a circle of moderate pro-life activists 
offered a new legal argument about post-abortion trauma.95 
Central to this effort were members of American Citizens 
Concerned for Life (ACCL), a group the National Organization for 
Women (NOW) described as a pro-life, “pro-birth control, pro-sex 
education” organization.96 Marjory Mecklenburg, one of the 
organization’s leaders, helped to formulate a theory addressing 
the relationship between trauma, motherhood, and abortion.97 
Mecklenburg became better known for her later role supervising 
federal family planning programs under the Reagan 
Administration,98 but her role in the abortion debate was far 
more complex. A former home economics teacher, Mecklenburg 
became one of the most powerful women in pro-life politics, 
serving as the chairwoman of the nation’s largest national 
antiabortion organization, advising Gerald Ford’s presidential 
campaign, and influencing national debate on a variety of gender 
issues.99  
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. 
 95. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1658 (“In this therapeutic form, post-
abortion syndrome was embraced by women in the antiabortion 
movement . . . .”). 
 96. NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, MAJOR NATIONAL GROUPS OPPOSED TO THE 
RIGHT TO CHOOSE 2 (1978) (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Harvard 
University, The NOW Papers, Box 54, Folder 42). 
 97. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 575–77 
(discussing the impact that Marjory Mecklenburg had in shaping the National 
Right to Life Committee). 
 98. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA M. LORD, CONDOM NATION: THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT’S SEX EDUCATION PROGRAM FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE INTERNET 
143–44 (2010) (discussing Reagan’s nominations of Koop and Mecklenburg). 
 99. See, e.g., Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at, 572–80 
(discussing Mecklenburg’s influence and career particularly with the National 
Right to Life Committee and American Citizens Concerned for Life); Mary 
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Mecklenburg’s ACCL argued that both abortion and 
unintended pregnancy created psychiatric distress.100 Partly for 
this reason, the organization supported mainstream pro-life 
initiatives, including a constitutional amendment that would 
prohibit private and public actors from performing abortions.101 
However, these activists argued that the state could fairly ban 
abortion only if it provided far-reaching rights for pregnant 
women, mothers, and postnatal children.102  
Over time, these moderate activists formulated a new 
understanding of the right to choose. While not acknowledging 
any constitutional protections for abortion, these advocates 
insisted that reproductive choice required both financial and 
symbolic support for childbirth and childrearing.103 
The ACCL first used this understanding of reproductive 
choice during the campaign for a fetal-rights amendment in the 
mid-1970s.104 Members of Congress had two constitutional 
amendments under consideration.105 The Buckley Amendment, 
proposed by Senator James Buckley (Conservative-NY), stated: 
                                                                                                     
Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-
Life Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 242 (2013) [hereinafter 
Ziegler, Rights on the Right] (discussing Mecklenburg’s campaigning for and 
testifying on behalf of the so-called Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy 
Prevention Act of 1978). 
 100. See Abortion—Part IV: Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, S.J. Res. 10 & 11, & 
S.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 655 (June 19, 1975) (statement of Marjory 
Mecklenburg, President, American Citizens Concerned for Life) [hereinafter 
Abortion Hearings] (“During the early months of pregnancy, it is not uncommon 
for any woman to react with fear, resentment, and depression.”). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 653–54 (arguing in support of the Human Life 
Amendment). 
 102. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 578–79 (“[T]he 
organization’s philosophy held that fetal rights could be protected only if women 
were themselves guaranteed better legal and economic opportunities.”). 
 103. See id. at 575 (“[M]embers of the Mecklenburg faction supported or at 
least accepted broad access to family planning services, as well as publicly-
funded daycare.” (citation omitted)). 
 104. See id. at 578–79 (“[T]he organization’s philosophy held that fetal rights 
could be protected only if women were themselves guaranteed better legal and 
economic opportunities.”). 
 105. See Human Life Amendment: Major Texts (Nat’l Comm. for a Human 
Life Amendment, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2004, at 1, 3, http://www.nchla.org/ 
datasource/idocuments/HLAmajortexts.pdf (describing the Amendments 
introduced by Senator Buckley and Representative Hogan). 
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“With respect to the right to life, the word ‘person’ . . . applies to 
all human beings, including their unborn offspring at every state 
of their biological development.”106 Representative Larry Hogan 
(R-Md.) offered an amendment describing: “Neither the United 
States nor any State shall deprive any human being, from the 
moment of conception, of life without due process of law.”107  
While endorsing such far-reaching bans on abortion, 
Mecklenburg focused on what the state owed mothers: “We need 
to ask what are the conditions of life which confront women who 
are troubled by an unintended pregnancy but who do not choose 
abortion. What are their rights? What is society’s duty to them 
and to the children they will bear?”108 
Mecklenburg formulated a new understanding of 
reproductive choice. The Supreme Court had set forth an idea of 
choice that mostly involved liberty from the state.109 Mecklenburg 
instead saw choice as inextricably linked to the idea of welfare 
rights.110 If the state recognized a right to choose to bear a child, 
as Mecklenburg argued, then the state had to guarantee women 
the means to raise that child.111 She asked Congress to support 
child care, sex education, family planning, and programs to 
encourage young girls to continue to pursue education in the 
setting of their choice.112 
In the same period, reproductive-rights activists in 
organizations like the Reproductive Rights National Network 
(R2N2) and the Committee for Abortion Rights and Against 
Sterilization Abuse (CARASA) connected state support and 
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. at 1.  
 107. Id. at 3.  
 108. Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 654. 
 109. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, 
whether it be found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty 
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the Ninth 
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people . . . .”). 
 110. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 579 (“[T]he 
only way to protect fetal rights was to [provide] . . . . ‘more medical assistance 
for the unwed mother and her baby, programs to keep pregnant girls in school 
and . . . provid[e] for daycare centers and . . . . prevent pregnancy.’” (quoting 
Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 643–53)).   
 111. Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 584–87. 
 112. Id. at 585–87.  
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reproductive freedom.113 These groups formed to offer a more 
radical alternative to the pro-choice movement—one that would 
fight for a more transformative agenda.114 In the late 1970s, 
CARASA, a New York-based reproductive-rights organization, 
described reproductive choice as the “[r]ight to decide when and 
whether to have/not have children; and [the] material possibility 
of making that choice.”115 For that choice to have meaning, 
CARASA argued, women needed access to birth control, child 
care, decent health care, and a decent income.116 In 1980, R2N2 
argued that reproductive freedom required that the state do more 
than leave women alone.117 True freedom required “a multi-issue 
approach to abortion . . . capable of fighting for all the economic 
and social conditions necessary for true reproductive freedom.”118 
Mecklenburg and the ACCL took a strongly different position 
on abortion.119 Just the same, some moderate pro-life activists 
and feminists agreed in significant part about the meaning of a 
right to choose.120 Mecklenburg believed that the state had an 
obligation to protect and honor mothers—both by banning 
abortion and by providing concrete support for caretaking.121 
                                                                                                     
 113. See Defend Women’s Right to Choose, Draft Outline for CARASA (c. 
1978) (discussing where the opposition was coming from and highlighting state 
politicians as someone to target) (on file with Bingham Library, Duke 
University, The Meredith Tax Papers). 
 114. See id. (discussing “reproductive freedom,” which included a broader 
agenda than just protecting the right to abortion). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See, e.g., id. (listing the “‘preconditions’ of free choice”). 
 117. See Marge Berer, Whatever Happened to ‘A Woman’s Right to Choose’?, 
FEMINIST REV., Summer 1988, at 24, 24 (“The phrase ‘women’s reproductive 
rights’ . . . . was first coined in the USA by feminists who formed the 
campaigning Reproductive Rights National Network. The concept . . . links up 
all different aspects of birth control and childbearing . . . .”). 
 118. WENDY KLINE, BODIES OF KNOWLEDGE: SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND 
WOMEN’S HEALTH IN THE SECOND WAVE 93 (2010). 
 119. See Hilgers, Mecklenburg & Riordan, supra note 14, at 178–79 (arguing 
that when abortion proponents argue that abortion is necessary to rid unwanted 
children, they are “really advocating the abandonment of women”). 
 120. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 574 (“A wide 
variety of antiabortion leaders held liberal or moderate views on some social 
issues. For example, . . . endorsement of sex education in public schools.”). 
 121. See id. at 579 (“Mecklenburg laid out one vision of the moderates’ 
philosophy: the only way to protect fetal rights was to ‘work harder than ever to 
make abortion unnecessary.’”). 
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Some feminists agreed that real choice required social justice as 
well as liberty.122 
Mecklenburg elaborated on this idea during the fight for the 
School-Age Mother and Child Health Act of 1975,123 a 
comprehensive program that would have set aside funding for 
pregnancy testing, comprehensive healthcare for newborns and 
toddlers, family planning, day care, continuing education, and 
adoption assistance.124 Pro-choice activists endorsed the reform, 
as did the ACCL.125 In testifying in favor of the bill, Mecklenburg 
elaborated on her idea of reproductive choice: “[M]any poor 
women, pressed by financial circumstances presently have only 
the ‘freedom’ to abort . . . . Surely, advocacy of the ‘right of a 
woman to choose’ does include the right for her to choose to 
continue the pregnancy.”126 
The School-Age Mother and Child Act of 1975 failed to 
pass,127 but the ACCL revived its campaign for reproductive 
choice in lobbying for the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA).128 Feminists viewed pregnancy disability reform quite 
differently than did Mecklenburg’s allies, presenting it as part of 
a larger project to separate women’s biological and social roles.129 
Those involved in the temporary disability struggle worked “to 
                                                                                                     
 122. See id. at 572 (“[P]ost-Roe compromise in the 1970s was more possible 
than is conventionally thought, especially on issues beyond abortion itself . . . 
[A]ntiabortion moderates campaigned for what they defined to be alternatives to 
abortion . . . .”). 
 123. National School-Age Mother and Child Health Act, H.R. 10589, 94th 
Cong. (1975).  
 124. See National School-Age Mother and Child Health Act of 1975: Hearing 
on S. 2538 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Sen. Comm. of Labor & Pub. 
Welfare, 94th Cong. 10–12 (1975) (outlining the proposed bill). 
 125. See, e.g., id. at 552–81 (statement of Jack Hood Vaughn of Planned 
Parenthood) (supporting the Act). 
 126. Id. at 499 (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg). 
 127. See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS CONCEPTION: THE POLITICS OF 
TEENAGE PREGNANCY 71 (1996) (discussing the Act). 
 128. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); see also 
Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 572 (stating that the ACCL 
“campaigned for what they defined as alternatives to abortion: for example, laws 
prohibiting pregnancy discrimination”). 
 129. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 68, at 450–51 (discussing the Citizens’ 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women’s advocacy for pregnancy to fit into 
the “pre-existing sex-neutral . . . . temporary disability paradigm”). 
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realize economic security for childbearing workers, without 
reinforcing sex-role stereotypes.”130 Significantly, leading 
feminists often opposed any special protection for mothers.131 
Describing pregnancy discrimination in this manner presented it 
as part of a larger effort to end women’s subordination in the 
family and the larger society.132 
In seeking to free women from sex stereotypes, feminists also 
presented publicly funded, universal day care as a fundamental 
right.133 By the early 1970s, feminists made some progress in the 
quest to secure this right, when the Comprehensive Child 
Development Act of 1971134 garnered significant support.135 The 
ultimately unsuccessful law would have offered affordable child 
care services to families across the socioeconomic spectrum.136 
Moderate pro-lifers supported both protections against 
pregnancy discrimination and federally mandated childcare 
programs, albeit for different reasons.137 The ACCL took up the 
issue of pregnancy discrimination after 1976, when the Supreme 
Court concluded that pregnancy discrimination did not constitute 
impermissible sex discrimination under the federal Civil Rights 
                                                                                                     
 130. Id. at 454. 
 131. See id. at 454–55 (discussing arguments of leading feminists). 
 132. See id. (“In advocating for distinct legal paradigms addressing the 
biological and social dimensions of reproduction, feminists aspired to unravel 
women’s capacity for pregnancy from the prescription of normative gender 
roles.”).  
 133. See, e.g., id. at 457–60 (discussing feminists’ arguments for childcare 
and their desire to “transform the family-wage system” as well as its political 
implications); Mary Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie: The Politics of Motherhood and 
the Future of Abortion Rights, 21 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 47, 54–55 (2011) 
[hereinafter Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie] (discussing the 1970 White House 
Conference on Youth and Children and its arguments for publicly funded day 
care).  
 134. Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971, 92 H.R. 6748, 92nd 
Cong. 
 135. See, e.g., Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie, supra note 133, at 54–57 
(discussing NOW’s emphasis on child development in advocating for day care). 
On the Act, see, for example, Dinner, supra note 68, at 461. 
 136. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 68, at 461 (discussing why the 
Comprehensive Child Development Act was unsuccessful). 
 137. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 589–90 
(discussing the compromise available after Roe because some pro-lifers, like 
Marjory Mecklenburg, supported state-funded support for alternatives to 
abortion). 
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Act.138 In the 1973 Supreme Court case Geduldig v. Aiello,139 the 
Court upheld a California disability policy that excluded 
pregnancy, concluding that such laws did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.140 Several years later, in General Electric v. 
Gilbert,141 the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provided no relief.142 In the wake of Gilbert, a 
coalition of feminist and labor activists vowed to pass a law 
changing the result of the Court’s decision.143  
Feminist advocacy for the PDA spoke “to sex equality, to 
women’s socioeconomic independence, and to the eradication of 
sex-role stereotypes.”144 By contrast, in lobbying for the PDA, the 
ACCL elaborated on the connection between sex discrimination 
and reproductive choice: 
[Pregnancy discrimination] has a severe impact upon low-
income workers who are forced to take unpaid maternity leave 
at precisely the time when expenses are increased . . . .  
When a wom[a]n is faced with losing her income for several 
weeks or months and perhaps with losing her job because of 
pregnancy, her decision to abort cannot be said to be the 
product of free choice of economic coercion.145 
                                                                                                     
 138. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976) (holding that 
General Electric’s disability-benefits plan did not violate Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities); 
Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 581 (“The ACCL’s influence 
was also apparent in the public response to the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision 
in General Electric Company v. Gilbert.”). 
 139. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 140. See id. at 497 (“The appellee simply contends that, although she has 
received insurance protection equivalent to that provided all other participating 
employees, she has suffered discrimination because she encountered a risk that 
was outside the program’s protection. . . . [W]e hold that this contention is not a 
valid one under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”). 
 141. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 142. See id. at 145–46 (“[I]ts disability-benefits plan does not violate Title 
VII because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 68, at 469–70 (“A coalition of labor, 
feminists, and civil rights groups, along with sympathetic congressional staff, 
mobilized in support of federal legislation to amend Title VII, which would 
override Gilbert . . . .”). 
 144. Id. at 470. 
 145. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 
Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the Comm. on Human Res., 95th 
Cong. 432 (1977) (statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel, 
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In advocating its own idea of reproductive choice, the ACCL 
ultimately joined feminists in supporting a version of the PDA 
that would require employers to fund leave after an abortion.146 
Abortion opponents in Congress, including Senator Thomas 
Eagleton (D-Mo.) and Representative Edward Beard (D-R.I.), had 
sought to amend the PDA to ensure that employers would not 
have to support employees receiving post-abortion care.147 The 
ACCL publicly endorsed the bill with or without such an 
exception.148 As ACCL member Dorothy Czarnecki explained: “I 
think a woman should be given her choice. This bill is good 
because it encourages people to remain pregnant rather than 
coerces them to abortion, but this [decision] would [depend on] a 
woman’s feelings. It is a matter of a woman’s choice that we 
would be allowing.”149 
If the Constitution truly protected a right to reproductive 
freedom, as the ACCL argued, that right included government 
assistance with the reproductive decisions women made.150 This 
                                                                                                     
American Citizens Concerned for Life) [hereinafter Pregnancy Discrimination 
Hearings]. 
 146. See, e.g., Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of 
Pregnancy Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 5055 & H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. of 
Emp’t Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 67 (1977) 
(statement of Dr. Dorothy Czarnecki, American Citizens Concerned for Life) 
[hereinafter Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination] (testifying that by 
providing equal disability coverage for women who receive an abortion or go 
through with the pregnancy, a woman’s choice is preserved). 
 147. See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, House Panel Bars Curb on Abortions in 
Women’s Aid Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1978, at A11 (reporting on the Beard 
Amendment proposed to antiabortion legislation); Senate Votes Pregnancy 
Benefits in Disability Plans for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1977, at A8 
(reporting on a bill to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and a proposed 
amendment by Senator Eagleton “that would have prohibited abortions from 
being considered a pregnancy-related medical expense that could be covered by” 
disability benefits). 
 148. See Pregnancy Discrimination Hearings, supra note 145, at 435 
(statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel, American Citizens 
Concerned for Life) (“I will discuss ACCL’s interest in this amendment and why 
the amendment is essential to secure protection and economic equality for 
pregnant women.”). 
 149. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination, supra note 146, at 67 
(statement of Dr. Dorothy Czarnecki). 
 150. See id. at 67–68 (arguing that government protection and financial 
assistance with the repercussions of pregnancy was necessary to ensure that 
women truly did have a right to choose regarding their reproductive freedom). 
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claim united pro-choice and pro-life activists dissatisfied with the 
Court’s reasoning in both Roe v. Wade and Maher v. Roe.151 Roe 
described a right to privacy broad enough to encompass decisions 
about abortion and contraception.152 Maher, a case on the 
constitutionality of state bans on the public funding of abortion, 
clarified that this right involved only a freedom from state 
interference rather than any entitlement to state support.153 For 
influential activists on either side of the abortion issue, the 
freedom to choose had to include government support for 
caretaking.154  
Mecklenburg and the ACCL also demanded accommodations, 
rather than mere equal treatment, for unwed mothers.155 The 
group lobbied consistently for a “comprehensive approach . . . 
[that would] provid[e] both medical care and psycho–social 
support.”156 Eliminating discrimination against unwed mothers 
would require the creation of government programs ensuring 
access to healthcare, education, and employment. 
Key sponsors of the PDA echoed this idea of reproductive 
choice. Pro-life Senators like Thomas Eagleton argued that sex 
discrimination could effectively coerce women into terminating a 
pregnancy.157 Representative Ronald Sarasin (R-Conn.) similarly 
                                                                                                     
 151. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 152. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (discussing the line of 
decisions establishing a right to privacy). 
 153. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74 (“[T]he right protects the woman from 
unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to 
terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to 
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds.”). 
 154. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 590 (“Because 
of the impact of these activists, important compromises remained viable in the 
years immediately after Roe, solutions involving contraception, daycare, or 
pregnancy discrimination rather than abortion itself.”). 
 155. See Abortion Hearings, supra note 100, at 655–66 (statement of Marjory 
Mecklenburg) (arguing that unwed mothers need state assistance with things 
such as education and practical skills and training). 
 156. Adolescent Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 12146 Before the Subcomm. on 
Select Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 110 (1978) 
(statement of Marjory Mecklenburg). 
 157. See Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978: S. 
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 96th Cong. 116 (1980) (statement of Senator 
Thomas Eagleton) [hereinafter Legislative History] (arguing that the PDA would 
rectify situations “where the price tag of a baby determines whether it is born or 
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argued that reproductive choice could not require a woman to 
sacrifice her career.158 In the past, Sarasin suggested, women had 
to choose “between having children and working.”159 The PDA 
gave a woman “the right to choose both, to be financially and 
legally protected before, during, and after her pregnancy.”160 The 
legislative history of the PDA suggested that the law would 
“facilitate a woman’s choice to conceive and bear children without 
facing undue economic hardships.”161 
Conventionally, scholars believe that Roe short-circuited the 
kind of partnership the ACCL successfully pursued.162 The PDA 
represented a successful post-Roe collaboration between abortion 
opponents and pro-choice activists. The version of the bill 
endorsed by the ACCL—one without a ban on abortion funding—
garnered the support of NARAL and NOW.163 Similarly, the 
ACCL partnered with Planned Parenthood in lobbying for the 
Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care 
Act, a law funding family planning, sex education, and child care 
for teenagers.164 
What can the ACCL’s campaign for reproductive choice tell 
us about post-Roe ideological entrenchment? First, the ACCL’s 
story shows that post-Roe politics created some incentive for 
compromise. Internal documents from the late 1970s suggest that 
ACCL members believed that pro-lifers could not be truly credible 
                                                                                                     
not”); see also id. at 185 (Statement of Paul Tsongas) (arguing that the PDA 
would “put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to 
choose between family and career”). 
 158. See id. at 208 (statement of Rep. Ronald Sarasin, Conn.) (“[I]t is a 
statement of the importance this country places on the family, of the fact that 
we must recognize the right of women to have families and to work.”). 
 159. Id. at 208–09 (statement of Rep. Ronald Sarasin). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 134 (statement of Rep. Baltasar Corrada). 
 162. See Ziegler, Possibility of Compromise, supra note 28, at 589 (“Roe v. 
Wade is seen to have marginalized moderates on either side of the abortion 
debate and, in so doing, to have undone the kinds of state-level compromise that 
had been unfolding at the state level.”). 
 163. See Legislative History, supra note 157, at 20 (listing organizations 
supporting the bill). 
 164. See Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act 
of 1978: Hearing on H.R. 12146 Before the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 
192–202 (1978) (statement of Faye Wattleton, Planned Parenthood Fed’n of 
Am.) (urging Congress to adopt the law).  
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or influential unless they worked with the opposition to make 
abortion less necessary.165 In order to be taken seriously, the 
argument went, pro-lifers had to be consistently concerned about 
vulnerable members of society, including pregnant women.166 
Second, the ACCL’s experiences complicate our 
understanding of post-Roe extremism. At first, it seems to make 
sense to connect Roe to the radicalization of all gender politics. By 
putting off limits many state compromises on abortion, Roe 
removed any reason for pro-lifers to settle for second-best 
solutions. As the ACCL’s story makes apparent, however, some 
activists believed that absolutist positions on abortion required 
compromise on other gender issues.167 Seeking out common 
ground in this way would reduce the need for abortion and 
strengthen society’s commitment to mothers’ rights.  
Later, as Part IV contends, it became more challenging to 
form alliances of this kind.168 The radicalization we blame solely 
on Roe occurred gradually. Polarization, moreover, took place 
partly without the influence of the Court. Moreover, as Part III 
shows, pro-choice as well as pro-life activists responded to Roe by 
working to find shared legal solutions. 
IV. Fetal Rights Beyond Abortion 
In Roe v. Wade, pro-choice amicus curiae briefs argued that, 
in any conflict between women’s rights and fetal rights, the 
woman’s interest in autonomy should prevail.169 After 1973, 
                                                                                                     
 165. See, e.g., AM. CITIZENS CONCERNED FOR LIFE, PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES 
OF ACCL 1 (1974) (explaining ACCL’s goal to “maximize the potential for 
cooperation in legislative and educational programs between ACCL and other 
citizens action groups where overlap of some concerns may occur/coalition 
building”) (on file with Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan, 
Box 17, The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Folder “ACCL 
Philosophy and Objectives”). 
 166. See id. (enumerating the goal of encouraging “a sense of responsibility 
for . . . pregnant women”).  
 167. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text (describing the ACCL’s 
support for child care, sex education, and family planning).  
 168. See infra Part IV (arguing that these alliances became more difficult 
after the emergence of the New Right). 
 169. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief for Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. and 
Am. Ass’n of Planned Parenthood Physicians as Amici Curiae Supporting 
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members of the abortion-rights movement had to consider 
whether support for legal abortion precluded any recognition of 
fetal rights.170 
Pro-choice activists debated these questions in the wake of 
legal struggles over fetal research. In contemporary politics, 
organizations like NOW consistently oppose most regulations on 
fetal research, suggesting that restrictions tend to curb medical 
progress and endanger abortion rights.171 In the immediate 
aftermath of Roe, by contrast, the relationship between abortion 
and fetal research—and even fetal rights—appeared far more 
fluid.172 Members of Congress and some organizations supportive 
of abortion rights endorsed limited protections for fetuses that did 
not conflict with a woman’s abortion decision.173 Pro-choice 
activists debated the propriety of fetal rights in the context of 
scientific experimentation and late-term abortion.174 
Only gradually did pro-choice support for fetal rights come to 
seem a contradiction in terms. Again, the Court did not serve as 
the primary source of polarization.175 Instead, as the pro-life 
                                                                                                     
Petitioners at 19, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (“There 
is no constitutional right or compelling state interest in the fetus which can 
render constitutional the violation of women’s physicians’ rights . . . .”); Brief for 
Orgs. and Named Women as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20–21, Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (“[E]ven if the position were 
accepted . . . that the fetus is a ‘person’ or ‘potential person,’ such recognition of 
the fetus would not provide the state with a compelling interest to justify 
encroachment upon the pregnant woman’s possession and free control of her 
own person.”). 
 170. Infra Parts IV.A–B.  
 171. See, e.g., Bush Once Again Sacrifices Science to Politics, NOW.ORG (Jul. 
18, 2006), http://www.now.org/issues/health/071806stemcellresearch.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2014) (describing the President’s likely veto against a stem-cell-
research bill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); NOW 
Legislative Updates 2001, NOW.ORG (Feb. 2001), http://www.now.org/issues/ 
legislat/200102.html#stem (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (describing how President 
Bush immediately began a pro-life agenda) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 172. See infra notes 177–93 and accompanying text (describing fetal 
research hearings).  
 173. See infra notes 178–84 and accompanying text (discussing Senator 
Edward Kennedy’s deliberation about fetal rights).  
 174. See infra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (deciding fetal rights do 
exist, but the fetus does not have any priority over the mother).  
 175. See ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 166 (asserting courts do not provide a 
great deal of social change).  
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movement scored a string of victories in state legislatures, 
supporters of abortion rights began to reject any law that could 
set a precedent for recognizing fetal personhood.176 For their part, 
abortion opponents often began to include laws on fetal research 
or “born alive” fetuses in multipart laws restricting abortion. For 
reasons having little to do with Roe, fetal rights seemed nothing 
more than an excuse for banning abortion. 
A. Fetal Research and Vulnerable Human Subjects 
In July 1973, several members of the National Institutes of 
Health urged the recognition of “human rights” for the aborted 
fetus, particularly in the context of fetal research.177 Surprisingly, 
the lawmaker at the center of a campaign for fetal rights, Senator 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA), led the effort to protect abortion rights 
in Congress. Before Roe, Kennedy, a devout Catholic, had come 
out against the complete repeal of abortion restrictions.178 
NARAL had singled him out for criticism.179 By 1974, however, 
Kennedy became one of the pro-choice movement’s strongest 
allies. He helped to engineer the defeat of the Bartlett 
Amendment, a failed ban on Medicaid funding for abortion.180 In 
later years, Kennedy would maintain his alliance with the pro-
choice movement.181 
                                                                                                     
 176. See infra notes 257–62 and accompanying text (discussing this 
progression to radicalism).  
 177. See Harold Schmeck, Health Agency Report Proposes Limits on Fetal 
Experiments, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1973, at 12 (“[S]taff members of the National 
Institutes of Health recommends [sic] prohibiting any experiments that would 
prolong the life of an aborted fetus once its ultimate survival was judged to be 
impossible.”).  
 178. See NARAL, Senator Edward Kennedy (c. 1972) (relating Kennedy’s 
pre-Roe opposition to “abortion on demand”) (on file with Schlesinger Library, 
Harvard University, Carton 1, The NARAL Papers, Carton 1, Folder “NARAL 
Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, 1974–75”). 
 179. See id. (responding to and criticizing Senator Kennedy’s remarks).  
 180. See, e.g., Marjorie Hunter, Senate Upholds U.S. Abortion Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1975, at 28 (reporting that Kennedy opposed the bill because he 
feared it would discriminate against the poor).  
 181. See, e.g., Amy H. Nemko, Case Note, Saving FACE: Clinic Access Under 
a New Commerce Clause, 106 YALE L.J. 525, 527 (1996) (discussing Kennedy’s 
role in reducing violence directed at reproductive health facilities). 
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Nonetheless, like other commentators, Kennedy saw some 
form of fetal protections as compatible with abortion rights.182 In 
May 1973, the generally pro-choice New York Times hinted at the 
complexity of the relationship between fetal research and 
abortion: “[D]oes anyone have the right to research on it without 
consent—and whose consent? The mother would ordinarily be the 
one to ask, but she has already asked for an abortion. Can she be 
said to have the best interest of the fetus at heart?”183 
When Congress held hearings on the subject of fetal 
research, Kennedy questioned “where if at all, [the] issue 
overlap[ped]with the abortion issue.”184 Just the same, Kennedy 
framed fetal research as one example of unregulated and often 
harmful human experimentation.185 In the 1970s, a number of 
medical scandals had attracted national media attention. One 
such scandal emerged in July 1972, when the Associated Press 
ran a story revealing the details of the Tuskegee study, a project 
begun forty years before on the effects of untreated syphilis on 
African–American men.186 The 400 men involved in the study had 
no idea what the study involved, and no test subject had received 
proper treatment.187 Other concerns surrounded public 
revelations about involuntary sterilizations.188 To some observers, 
                                                                                                     
 182. See O. Carter Snead, Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of 
Integration, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 1538–39 (describing Edward Kennedy’s 
role in passing the National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 
(1974), legislation designed to evaluate the ethical principles of human 
research).  
 183. Harold M. Schmeck Jr., What Price Research?: Fetuses Medicine, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 1973, at 252.  
 184. Fetal Research, 1974: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. 
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 2 (1974) (statement of Sen. 
Edward Kennedy) [hereinafter Fetal Research Hearing].  
 185. See id. at 7 (reciting Kennedy’s questioning about fetal research 
causing mental retardation). 
 186. See, e.g., Jean Heller, Syphilis Victims in U.S. Went Untreated for 40 
Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1972, at 1 (describing the participants as “guinea 
pigs” and noting they never received treatment even after effective syphilis 
medicine emerged). 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 1, 8 (stating that no doctor prescribed antibiotics for the 
syphilis patients). For further analysis of the “Tuskegee Experiment,” see 
generally SUSAN REVERBY, TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE 
SYPHILIS STUDY (2000); JAMES HOWARD JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE 
SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993). 
 188. See, e.g., REBECCA MARIE KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND 
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fetal research represented another example of victimization 
through human experimentation.189 
In 1974, congressional hearings made apparent the 
distinctions between fetal research and abortion. Pro-life witness 
Andre Hellegers reasoned: “The case can no longer be argued 
under slogans such ‘Every woman has a right to control her own 
body’ since the fetus is no longer inside her body . . . . In brief, 
there is no longer any possible conflict between the fetus and its 
mother.”190 
In the absence of a conflict, could the fetus have any rights? 
Dr. Richard Behrman, a champion of fetal research, argued that 
decisions about fetal research “should be made by an uncoerced 
and reasonably adequately informed individual or individuals 
whose interests are substantially overlapping or identical to those 
of the proposed subject.”191 Kennedy believed that true protection 
required the establishment of a permanent scientific commission 
that would supervise all human experimentation, including any 
concerning fetuses.192 
The 1974 hearings raised a number of difficult questions for 
the pro-choice movement. Did pro-choice activists logically have 
to oppose restrictions on fetal research? Could activists reconcile 
fetal rights with women’s interest in reproductive autonomy? 
These questions proved difficult for some pro-choice 
organizations. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a 
leading pro-choice organization, actually adopted a vision of fetal 
rights. 
                                                                                                     
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA 190 (2009) (describing some doctors’ 
resistance and dismissal of sterilization reform); Sterilization: Newest Threat to 
the Poor, EBONY, Oct. 1973, at 150, 150–53 (evaluating sterilization with special 
attention to its relationship with welfare).  
 189. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-224, at 11–12 (1973) (finding that the Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce “feels the present standards of ethical 
conduct make research on living fetuses unethical”).  
 190.  Fetal Research Hearing, supra note 184, at 95 (statement of Andre 
Hellegers, Director of the Kennedy Institute for Bioethics at Georgetown 
University). 
 191. Id. at 49 (statement of Richard Behrman, Chairman of the Department 
of Pediatrics at Columbia University).  
 192. See Harold M. Schmeck Jr., Conferees Agree to Ban Research on Live 
Fetus, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1974, at 1 (stating although Kennedy favored a 
permanent national commission, the compromise established one for two years).  
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B. The ACLU and Fetal Rights 
In the mid-1970s, the ACLU made a major contribution to 
the advancement of abortion rights. The organization’s 
Reproductive Rights Freedom Project, founded in 1974, led efforts 
to defend Roe in the courts.193 Nonetheless, the ACLU Privacy 
Committee proposed protections for fetal rights that its members 
believed to be consistent with Roe.  
At a June 1976 meeting, the Committee members concluded 
that women’s interests took priority, but if a woman had nothing 
to lose from the choice of one procedure or another, the state 
should recognize fetal rights.194 The Committee focused on 
whether the Roe decision precluded any recognition of fetal 
rights: “Do we define abortion as relieving the mother of the 
pregnancy or as killing the fetus?”195 The question set the agenda 
for latter battles within the ACLU.196  
In October 1976, disagreement within the Committee 
intensified. One member present took the position that the 
Fourteenth Amendment created “an affirmative obligation to 
protect and support life.”197 A child welfare expert argued that 
the Committee should “adopt the position that the right to abort 
is the right to kill,” which was Roe’s “full implication[ ].”198 Others 
insisted that “the medical profession [should] make decisions” 
about the breadth of abortion rights.199  
In October and November, the Committee agreed to 
recognize fetal rights, all the while balancing them against a 
woman’s paramount right to reproductive freedom.200 While 
                                                                                                     
 193. See STAGGENBORG, supra note 64, at 59 (discussing the ACLU’s legal 
efforts after Roe). 
 194. See ACLU MEETING MINUTES, June 1976, supra note 22, at 2 (stating 
“the doctor should choose the method that keeps the baby alive”).  
 195. Id. at 3. 
 196. See id. (acknowledging that the questions posed at the meeting will 
control the Committee’s agenda for the rest of the year).  
 197. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PRIVACY COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES, 
OCTOBER 13, 1976, at 1 (1976) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University, 
Box 112, The ACLU Papers, Folder 8 “Rare Books and Manuscripts Division”). 
 198. Id. at 2.  
 199. Id. at 3.  
 200. See Memorandum from Barbara Kaiser to Am. Civil Liberties Union 
Privacy Comm. 1 (Nov. 30, 1976) [hereinafter “Memorandum from Barbara 
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acknowledging that “the rights of the fetus can be limited by 
practical considerations,” the Committee concluded that “society 
must accept responsibility if the mother desires to be relieved of 
her obligation.”201 The Committee also recognized that the 
knowledge that the fetus would survive might chill women’s 
reproductive decisionmaking, particularly late in a pregnancy.202 
Nonetheless, in November, the Committee concluded that women 
had no right to avoid knowing the “fate of the fetus,” given the 
importance of both fetal rights and the First Amendment 
interests of those who would otherwise speak out on the 
matter.203 
The Committee turned next to the issue of fetuses that 
survived an abortion procedure.204 Again, the Committee 
reasoned that fetal rights and women’s abortion rights could 
coexist.205 Without threatening legal abortion, the Committee 
believed, the state could give the fetus rights to medical care after 
the completion of an abortion.206 As importantly, in any state that 
restricted abortion, the fetus had a right to financial support.207  
In 1975, the federal government similarly tried to separate 
the issues of abortion and fetal rights. Congress chartered a 
group to study the question—the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare’s National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research—the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—which approved 
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regulations requiring the preclearance of any research that 
harmed a fetus.208 The Commission required researchers to use 
only fetuses under twenty weeks of age and to show that their 
research did not compromise the chances of fetal survival.209 Like 
the ACLU Privacy Committee, the Commission discussed fetal 
rights as a subject that could be separated from abortion.210 
This Article next examines some of the reasons that 
collaboration between pro-choice and pro-life activists became so 
difficult later in the 1970s. The ACCL’s project ran into difficulty 
as the pro-life movement forged a lasting partnership with the 
Republican Party.211 By the early 1980s, constitutional and 
political support for welfare rights had eroded, and the pro-life 
movement had adopted the social and fiscal conservatism of its 
new partners.212 
Political party realignment also undermined the kind of fetal 
rights proposal explored by the ACLU. The pro-life partnership 
with the New Right made its cause appear both antifeminist and 
anti-woman. In the same period, activists prioritized the passage 
of multirestriction laws, like those introduced in Akron, Ohio, and 
the State of Missouri.213 These laws limited access to abortion in a 
variety of ways, and many multirestriction bills also addressed 
fetal research, the choice of abortion procedure, or post-abortion 
fetal care.214 For pro-choice activists, these laws served as further 
evidence of pro-life desire to keep women in traditional roles.215 If 
all fetal-rights laws sought to keep women in their place, pro-
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choice leaders believed, there was no way to reconcile the rights 
of women and unborn children. 
V. Radicalization Outside the Court 
Scholars have attributed a great deal of post-Roe polarization 
to the Supreme Court’s sweeping decision. As Reva Siegel and 
Linda Greenhouse have shown, well before 1973, leaders of the 
Republican Party had their own reasons for escalating the 
abortion conflict.216 As this Part contends, the struggle ratcheted 
up after 1973 for reasons having little to do with the Supreme 
Court. Beginning in the mid-1970s, political party realignment 
accelerated.217 Socially conservative, evangelical Protestants 
mobilized to an unprecedented extent.218 Political operatives like 
Paul Weyrich and direct-mail guru Richard Viguerie used 
abortion to bring new voters into the Republican Party, as did 
then-presidential candidate Ronald Reagan.219 Pro-lifers had 
financial, ideological, and political reasons for partnering with 
the New Right.220 In forging a working relationship with social 
conservatives, abortion opponents took more extreme and 
consistently right-wing positions on a number of gender issues.221 
In response, pro-choice leaders expressed skepticism about any 
effort to recognize fetal rights.222 For reasons having little to do 
with the Court, movement members, politicians, and political 
operatives deliberately and consistently made decisions that 
intensified abortion conflict. 
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A. Moving to the Right 
As Daniel Williams has shown, the leaders of the emerging 
New Right viewed abortion as a promising wedge issue.223 The 
New Right, a name chosen by its leaders, emerged in the wake of 
the Watergate scandal.224 Weyrich, Viguerie, and their partners 
wanted to create a conservative movement outside the 
mainstream Republican Party.225 Social issues, like abortion, 
promised to win the support of Catholics, fundamentalist 
Christians, and others who conventionally voted for the 
Democratic Party.226 
The New Right intensified conflict about abortion for political 
ends. In 1979, Weyrich and Viguerie met with Jerry Falwell and 
other leading evangelical Protestants to craft a conservative 
political agenda that would suit the newly active base.227 In 
framing a pro-family agenda, Weyrich “proposed . . . that abortion 
be made the keystone of [a new] organizing strategy, since that 
was the issue that could divide the Democratic Party.”228 Weyrich 
and the New Right took a number of concrete steps to deepen 
public divisions about abortion. Weyrich helped to fund the 
formation of absolutist pro-life organizations, like the American 
Life Lobby, and a pro-life political action committee, the Life 
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Amendment Political Action Committee (LAPAC), that worked to 
put abortion on the top of the national political agenda.229  
The abortion conflict also intensified as both political parties 
cemented their positions on abortion. During the 1976 
presidential primary, incumbent Gerald Ford had identified as a 
moderate, refusing to take any position on a fetal-life amendment 
to the Constitution.230 By contrast, Ford’s opponent, Ronald 
Reagan, took a strong pro-life position, drawing on movement 
rhetoric and endorsing a fetal-life amendment.231 Although Ford 
defeated Reagan in the primary (and ultimately lost the election), 
Reagan’s commitments made him a “darling of abortion 
opponents.”232 His unsuccessful primary run made clear the 
potential of abortion as an election issue.233 Promising pro-life 
voters dramatic constitutional and social change would, the 
argument went, bring Republicans a large and energetic group of 
new voters.234  
Why was an alliance with the New Right and the Republican 
Party appealing to a diverse pro-life movement? As Part III 
suggests, some movement members endorsed welfare rights for 
women that would more easily fit in the Democratic, rather than 
Republican, party platform.235 Nonetheless, by the late 1970s, 
movement leaders had reason to join a larger conservative 
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alliance. Financially, the New Right promised abortion opponents 
unprecedented support.236 Organizations like the Moral Majority 
and Christian Voice had an impressive financial record.237 At one 
point, in the late 1970s, the Moral Majority raised as much as $1 
million a week.238 In 1978, the NRLC, the largest national pro-life 
organization, had debts as large as $25,000.239 Working with 
social conservatives promised to make the pro-life cause 
financially stable. 
Political influence also seemed likely to follow from a 
partnership with social conservatives. After 1976, pro-life leaders 
like Carolyn Gerster of the NRLC and Paul Brown of the Life 
Amendment Political Action Committee began complaining about 
the difficulty of winning new Democratic supporters in 
Congress.240 By contrast, because of the influence of social 
conservatives, the Republican Party nominated Reagan, a pro-life 
stalwart, during the 1980 election season and endorsed an 
antiabortion constitutional amendment.241 
Working with the New Right and the Republican Party 
reshaped the pro-life movement’s agenda. Before partnering with 
social conservatives, many pro-life organizations took no formal 
position on the ERA.242 Later in the 1970s, convinced by 
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antifeminists and New Right leaders that the Amendment would 
make it impossible to overrule Roe, pro-lifers condemned the 
Amendment.243 As other members of the New Right coalition 
worked to undo the impact of decisions by the Warren and Burger 
Courts,244 pro-lifers took up the cause of opposing judicial 
activism, signaling opposition to decisions on matters from school 
prayer to busing.245 
Political party realignment made the ACCL’s project much 
more challenging.246 For many in the pro-life movement, common 
ground involved the provision of welfare rights for women.247 
Abortion opponents like Mecklenburg believed that women who 
chose abortion were vulnerable and deserving of state support.248  
During the 1980 election, however, Ronald Reagan tapped 
into public anxieties about the size, cost, and inefficiency of the 
welfare state. As Governor of California, Reagan had pioneered a 
“required work” program designed to cut the cost of entitlement 
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programs,249 and during the 1980 election, both Reagan and 
incumbent Jimmy Carter agreed that the “welfare burden” had 
become “too onerous for local governments to bear.”250 Following 
his election, Reagan called for “fundamental reform” of 
entitlement programs, making support available only to the 
“truly needy.”251 In allying with the Republican Party and the 
New Right, the pro-life movement signed on to a small-
government agenda. 
As importantly, the vision of women’s rights advanced by 
social conservatives differed dramatically from the ideas 
Mecklenburg had promoted.252 Later in the 1970s, in the 
campaign for the ERA, the New Right developed a different idea 
of women’s rights. Like Mecklenburg’s allies, ERA supporters 
believed that women and men were not yet equal.253 Led by 
antifeminist Phyllis Schlafly, the New Right instead contended 
that sex equality would harm, rather than help, women.254 In 
1975, Schlafly contended that the ERA would “take away from 
women the rights they already have, such as the right of a wife to 
be supported by her husband, the right of a woman to be 
exempted from military combat, and your right, if you wanted it, 
to go to a single-sex college.”255 Pro-lifers gravitated toward this 
vision of women’s rights partly because Schlafly successfully 
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argued—contrary to what many feminists maintained—that the 
ERA would strengthen abortion rights.256 Schlafly explained in 
1977 that feminists would soon learn that “‘the equal rights 
amendment and abortion are antifamily goals, and not what the 
American people want.’”257 That year, prominent abortion 
opponents began attending anti-ERA rallies and adopting a 
larger antifeminist agenda.258 ERA politics left little room for the 
vision of women’s rights advanced by pro-lifers seeking common 
ground. Schlafly’s battle suggested that abortion opponents could 
not compromise with feminists without sacrificing the unborn.259 
In this new climate, pro-life attorneys worked to redefine 
what reproductive choice meant to the movement. Rather than 
seeking other reproductive freedoms for women, pro-lifers could 
use the language of choice exclusively to undercut Roe. Beginning 
in the late 1970s, Americans United for Life (AUL), the pro-life 
movement’s leading public interest litigation firm, elaborated on 
this strategy in a string of victories in the courts.260 The AUL’s 
strategy assumed that Roe was good law but sought to narrow its 
protections.261 Describing abortion as a right to choose, in this 
account, meant that the state had a broader power to regulate 
abortion so long as women retained the ultimate decision.262 As 
the AUL’s brief explained: “If the abortion decision is so 
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private . . . it follows that government shall not itself be 
compelled to respond to the demand of the exercise of that 
right.”263   
In the new pro-life movement, moderates’ campaign for 
reproductive choice appeared anomalous. Mecklenburg and her 
allies had demanded protections against sex discrimination, 
while the New Right argued that equality would be a step down 
for women. Advocates like Mecklenburg fought for the expansion 
of the welfare state that Reagan and the New Right intended to 
attack. Roe did little to undercut pro-life efforts to seek out 
compromise. However, later in the decade, changes to the 
political landscape made these efforts to find common ground 
more challenging. 
As Part IV demonstrates, some in the pro-choice movement 
also sought consensus, exploring ways in which the state could 
protect fetal rights without undermining reproductive autonomy. 
By the early 1980s, pro-choice leaders viewed any fetal-protective 
law with much more skepticism. Two developments undermined 
any pro-choice interest in fetal rights. First, the New Right and 
the Religious Right made abortion part of a broader antifeminist 
agenda.264 In the new political climate, supporters of abortion 
rights more often saw fetal-protective laws as a vehicle for 
enforcing traditional gender roles. In the same period, abortion 
opponents promoted multirestriction laws designed to decrease 
access to abortion.265 These laws often included measures that 
protected fetuses outside the abortion context. Pro-choice 
activists began to oppose any fetal protective law, viewing such 
measures as an attack on Roe. 
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B. Pro-Life and Antifeminist 
Before the late 1970s, the pro-life movement had an 
ambiguous relationship with second-wave feminism. Major 
organizations like the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) 
took no position on major feminist reforms like the ERA.266 Other 
organizations, like Feminists for Life, actively campaigned for the 
Amendment and laws allowing married women to take credit in 
their names.267 Even pro-choice activists viewed the pro-life 
movement as theocratic rather than antifeminist, imposing one 
set of religious beliefs on the rest of the country.268 
In working with the New Right, the pro-life movement 
radically revised its positions. In the late 1970s, organizations 
like the NRLC came out against the ERA and campaigned 
against funding for feminist conferences like the one celebrating 
International Women’s Year.269 Pro-lifers’ alliance with the New 
Right made antiabortion activism appear synonymous with social 
conservatism.270 Pro-choice activists began to conclude that 
antifeminism motivated abortion opponents rather than religion 
or fetal rights. In a January 1978 fundraising letter, for example, 
NOW President Eleanor Smeal warned of “[a] major attack on 
[women’s] rights.”271 In a New York Times editorial in June 1978, 
former NARAL leader Larry Lader presented the pro-life 
movement as an offshoot of far-right radicalism.272 In 1980, 
Planned Parenthood President Faye Wattleton described abortion 
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opponents as “an increasingly vocal and at times violent minority 
which seeks to deny all of us our fundamental rights of privacy 
and individual decision-making.”273 To many in the pro-choice 
movement, pro-lifers’ partnership with the New Right made fetal-
rights rhetoric appear to be nothing more than an effective 
repackaging of sexist views.  
The new strategy adopted by pro-lifers reinforced this 
impression. Beginning in the mid-1970s, abortion opponents 
worked harder to promote multipart laws restricting access to 
abortion.274 Statutes and city ordinances required informed 
consent, spousal and parental consent.275 Other laws prohibited 
saline abortions, required life-saving fetal care after an abortion, 
or defined fetal viability more narrowly than had the Roe 
Court.276 These laws framed all fetal-protective measures as 
efforts to ban abortion.277 
These efforts raised concerns that pro-lifers would use any 
recognition of fetal rights to attack Roe. If fetal-protective laws 
set a precedent for efforts to undermine abortion, the pro-choice 
movement could not support fetal rights without weakening the 
foundation for abortion rights.278 
Immediately after Roe, activists on both sides of the abortion 
issue believed that compromise was both possible and desirable. 
The escalation of conflict came later, with little input from the 
courts. In the late 1970s, political party realignment that began 
before Roe accelerated. With the emergence of the New Right and 
the Religious Right, the Republican Party adopted a robust social 
conservatism, and the pro-life movement gained powerful new 
partners. Political reordering created new obstacles for those 
seeking common ground. 
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The history of Roe’s aftermath spotlights the influence of 
nonjudicial actors on post-Roe polarization. If we focus less 
exclusively on the Court, what difference does it make to 
contemporary scholarship? Part VI takes up this question next. 
VI. Roe and the Consequences of Judicial Review 
Backlash arguments address the consequences of asking too 
much of the courts.279 Backlash theorists use history to caution 
social movements against overreliance on the courts.280 Roe, 
however, serves as an example of the dangers faced by courts as 
well as by activists.281 Using Roe as a paradigm, beyond backlash 
arguments illustrate the harms that judicial decisions can do to 
both the authority of the Court and to the larger society. In 
particular, scholars point to post-Roe polarization as a cost of 
judicial intervention in abortion politics.282 By moving too fast, 
the Court alienated the pro-life movement, undid promising 
compromises, and hopelessly radicalized discussion.  
Reasoning from Roe, legal scholars have developed a 
compelling account of the political costs of different interpretive 
methods. Richard Posner sees Roe as an example of the damage 
done by courts that reject or misunderstand pragmatism.283 
Pragmatism asks the courts to consider, among other things, how 
to formulate opinions with desirable consequences.284 A more 
pragmatic Court, Posner predicts, would have arrived at a 
solution that would have commanded widespread support.285 Cass 
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Sunstein similarly uses Roe to showcase the benefits of an 
alternative theory that he calls minimalism.286 Because Roe came 
down at a time when abortion was still divisive, the Court made a 
mistake by issuing a broad and philosophical ruling.287 Roe’s 
sweep undercut a process of state-by-state negotiation that could 
have lowered the temperature of debate and provided more 
opportunities for compromise.288  
William Eskridge also views Roe as a prime source of 
polarization. Eskridge advises the courts to craft decisions that 
lower the stakes of ordinary politics and facilitate democratic 
deliberation.289 In issuing a far-reaching decision before any 
consensus formed, Roe convinced pro-life Americans that they 
could not accomplish their goals through working in ordinary 
politics.290 By alienating so many activists, Eskridge suggests, 
Roe unnecessarily escalated the abortion conflict.291 
Scholars like Eskridge, Sunstein, and Posner further use Roe 
in issuing prescriptions for courts concerned with the social and 
political costs of judicial review. As the Article has shown, 
however, the narrative on which they rely is flawed. The 
radicalization of abortion politics occurred gradually and in 
response to more than the Court’s decision.292 In the late 1960s 
and 1970s, abortion became a national political question, and 
leading Republican operatives used it to court new voters.293 
Other scholars have shown that Roe alone did not produce 
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hopelessly divided abortion politics. This Article adds a new 
dimension to the discussion by showing that, for almost a decade 
after the decision, abortion politics little resembled the bitter, 
dysfunctional debate with which so many have found fault.294  
To activists on both sides of the abortion issue, compromise 
seemed not only possible but strategically crucial. In the 1970s, 
pro-choice activists conducted a thoughtful conversation about 
whether and how fetal rights and women’s rights could coexist.295 
Supporters of abortion rights imagined fetal rights to financial 
support, informed consent by proxy, and a chance of survival.296 
At the same time, these advocates reaffirmed their support for 
women’s right to the safest abortion procedure available.297 Roe 
did not obscure potential differences between abortion and 
questions of fetal rights ex utero.  
Some pro-life advocates also sought common ground in 
response to Roe. Far from arguing that there was no right to 
reproductive choice, moderate abortion opponents instead 
reworked the idea of privacy advanced by the Roe Court.298 These 
activists rejected the idea that a right to choose covered abortion. 
In other ways, however, they demanded broader reproductive 
rights than those set forth in Roe.299 As moderates framed it, 
reproductive choice required state support for motherhood—
public funding for day care, contraception, and health care, to be 
sure, but also protections against sex and pregnancy 
discrimination.  
Legal scholars urge judges to use Roe’s history in measuring 
the consequences of any potential decision.300 As the Article 
shows, however, we have mistakenly blamed Roe for events that 
occurred later and partly without the influence of the courts. 
Insofar as Roe offers an example, beyond backlash arguments 
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exaggerate the influence of judicial decisions, neglecting the 
impact, motives, and negotiations of nonjudicial actors. That is 
not to say that judicial decisions do not matter or that legal 
scholars should not study the consequences of different modes of 
decision making. If Roe teaches us anything, however, it is that 
the courts play only one part in a much more complex process.  
More accurately assessing Roe’s significance makes apparent 
new questions about abortion law and judicial review. Did Roe 
have any negative impact on abortion politics, albeit one less 
central than we might have previously believed? How did we 
come to believe that Roe produced a depressingly radicalized 
debate so much earlier and so much more thoroughly than is the 
case? A better historical understanding of consensus-seeking 
efforts after Roe is only the beginning of this inquiry. 
This Article suggests that any lessons offered by Roe’s history 
for students of judicial review are more complex and less 
predictive than we have often thought. On its own, the Court did 
not cause and could hardly have anticipated the polarization of 
gender politics in the early 1980s. If judges wish to learn from 
Roe’s aftermath, the lesson is not a simple one involving the costs 
of judicial decisions that do too much too soon. If anything, Roe’s 
history suggests that legal academics need to attend better to the 
influence of nonjudicial actors on constitutional politics and on 
the meaning of blockbuster judicial decisions. 
The history of compromise in the wake of Roe also provides a 
much needed dose of optimism about the future prospects in the 
abortion wars. For different reasons, Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg describe Roe as an obstacle to the creation of a more 
rational and collaborative abortion debate.301 Since the 1973 
decision, the argument goes, nonjudicial actors have substantially 
less power to lower the stakes of abortion politics. The history 
examined here offers a more hopeful story. After Roe, activists on 
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both sides of the abortion issue followed creative paths toward 
compromise.302 The Court did not make these projects impossible 
to pursue. By extension, when the abortion battle intensified, a 
variety of nonjudicial actors, including politicians, activists, and 
operatives, shared responsibility.303 The world of 1970s abortion 
politics is in many ways removed from our own. Nonetheless, the 
story of Roe’s aftermath suggests that we can do more than we 
think to lower the temperature of the abortion wars.  
Finally, the history of responses to Roe foregrounds the 
importance of legal solutions related to, but separate from, 
abortion. In the 1970s, compromise-minded activists appeared as 
unwilling to negotiate about the scope of abortion rights as are 
any advocates today. Nonetheless, for many on either side of the 
issue, Roe made more urgent the search for legal solutions that 
would lower the stakes of the abortion wars. Abortion opponents 
primarily looked for ways to reduce the need for abortion, both by 
targeting discrimination against women and by ensuring that 
women had adequate resources to support themselves. Pro-choice 
advocates searched for ways to dignify fetal life that would not 
directly undermine abortion rights. 
Both strategies may have some promise today. Since at least 
the 1990s, leading voices in the pro-life movement have argued 
for the importance of demonstrating concern for women as well as 
for unborn children.304 On the pro-choice side, some organizations 
representing abortion providers have called for a more nuanced 
discussion of fetal life and fetal dignity.305  
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For the most part, however, activists have argued that the 
other side’s position on abortion has destructive effects. Recently, 
with the advent of what Reva Siegel calls woman-protective 
antiabortion arguments, pro-lifers have stressed the ways in 
which abortion harms women.306 Since the early 1970s, pro-choice 
activists have asserted that abortion bans are anti-life and anti-
child, harming children who are born to parents who do not want 
or cannot adequately provide for them.307 If anything, these 
arguments have exacerbated abortion conflict. Woman-protective 
arguments not only justify abortion restrictions but also draw on 
sex stereotypes that are offensive to many in the pro-choice 
movement. In turn, pro-choice arguments about the damage done 
to unwanted children do not square with pro-life claims that all 
lives, particularly those of the disabled, are equally worthy. 
Social-movement responses to Roe suggest that compromise 
on related gender issues may be easier to achieve. Pro-life 
organizations like All Our Lives endorse access to contraception 
or legislation protecting women against domestic violence—goals 
endorsed by many feminist and pro-choice organizations.308 It 
may still be possible to create the kind of solution Roe supposedly 
destroyed.  
VII. Conclusion 
Can courts fuel social change? In answering this question, 
legal scholars and members of the Supreme Court turn to 
reactions to Roe. For backlash theorists, Roe illustrates the ways 
in which judicial decisions can set back a cause the Justices 
endorse. For other observers, Roe serves as an example of the 
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damage judicial review can do the larger society. According to 
this account, opinions that do too much too soon produce 
polarization, undermine productive negotiations, and deform 
social-movement politics. 
This Article offers a more nuanced perspective on the role 
played by the Court in gender politics. Far from putting an end to 
efforts to identify common ground, Roe intensified attempts made 
by some pro-choice and pro-life activists to find some form of 
consensus. When these efforts stalled, a variety of nonjudicial 
actors had at least as much responsibility as the Court. 
Forty years later after it was decided, Roe remains one of the 
most iconic and impactful Supreme Court decisions of the past 
century—a touchstone for those seeking to understand the 
Court’s role in American politics. We are right to believe that Roe 
matters, but in attributing so much about contemporary politics 
to the Court’s decision, we have lost sight of the world left in 
Roe’s wake and the reasons for its disappearance. What, then, 
does Roe remind us? The lesson does not simply involve the 
influence of judicial review or the intractable polarization of the 
abortion debate. If Roe should serve as a symbol of anything, it is 
the complex interplay between party politics, social-movement 
strategy, and Supreme Court politics. By building on a deeper 
understanding of Roe’s history, we will better able to understand 
that complexity. 
  
